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DEVINE ON DEFINING RELIGION 
Tomis Kapitan 
Philip E. Devine has presented insightful proposals for defining religion in his essay "On 
the Definition of Religion" (Faith and Philosophy, July 1986). But despite his illuminating 
discussion, particularly the treatment of borderline cases, his account fails to distinguish 
religion as a process or goal-oriented activity from religion as a body of doctrine, and is 
mistaken (or perhaps unclear) in its proposal that religion per se is committed to the exist-
ence of superhuman agents. These deficiencies are exposed herein, and a sketch of an 
alternative view of religion, inspired by the views of both William James and Josiah 
Royce, is set forth. 
I. Devine' s Program 
A plausible definition of "religion" must attempt to demarcate religion from other 
forms of human culture, such as art, politics, science, philosophy, and law. Since 
activities in these domains are intricably interwoven, this is a difficult requirement 
to meet. Religious systems, in particular, not only incorporate achievements, 
beliefs, and practices of other cultural forms, but differ widely among themselves, 
complicating, even discouraging, the task of demarcation. Equally troubling are 
the broad and diverse applications of the term 'religion.' But before yielding to 
skeptical despair, the importance of a definition should be kept in view; the very 
reference to religion in legal statutes, the respect accorded religious leaders and 
religious tracts, the often bitter and bloody disputes over domain, the anchoring of 
self-identity in religious affiliation, underscore the sensitive nature of the project. 
As Devine writes: 
For shifting definitions of "religion" can be used to favor beliefs and insti-
tutions with which one is in sympathy, and to penalize those to which 
one is hostile. (p. 271) 
This said, Devine launches into his own attempt at a definition. Taking the 
standard forms of Christianity as his "paradigm" he lists two criteria for the exist-
ence of a religion: 
The first criterion is doctrinal; a religion affirms the existence of one or 
more superhuman agents, on whose favor the welfare of human beings 
depends .... The second criterion is psychosocial or functional. A 
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religion by the second criterion unifies, through a system of symbolic 
representations, the framework by which an individual or group regulates 
its thought and its life, and thus manages to maintain in them some 
semblance of coherence. (p. 272) 
Neither criterion by itself is sufficient for the existence of religion; not the first 
because it fails to distinguish religion from any philosophical or scientific theory 
which endorses the same thesis, nor the second since a wide variety of normative 
codes can be similarly characterized. What is unclear is whether Devine intends 
them to be jointly sufficient or as individually necessary; while this is as close as he 
comes to defining religion, he expresses misgivings that offering necessary and 
sufficient conditions is the proper pattern of analysis, at least for the case at hand 
(p. 271). Again, with his "less central" criteria, i.e., the presence of a concept of 
salvation, the existence of sacred objects, the existence of a religious community, 
a canon of Scripture, prayer, crisis-solving strategies, and an embodiment of pro-
test against aspects of the existing order that keep people in bondage, there is no 
indication, given his undefined use of 'criteria,' that any is either necessary or 
sufficient for religion. 
II. Goal-Oriented Activity 
A reliable definition of religion must capture the sense in which a person can be 
"religious" and, similarly, in which religion is, at least in part, a mode of living 
or an activity, specifically, goal-oriented activity. It may seem odd to speak in 
these terms, as though one might engage in religion in the way that a musician 
performs and composes music or a physicist conducts experiments and devises 
theories. Religion is neither an action nor a set of actions. However, by being re-
ligious one certainly thinks, acts and lives in the pursuit of characteristic ends, e.g., 
procuring divine favor or attaining Nirvana, whether one does so by means of 
overt physical behavior or through patterned mental activity in the form of belief, 
worship, meditation, and so forth. The "goal-oriented" nature of the religious 
traditions may differ. 
This not only requires a distinction between religion per se and particular re-
ligious systems, viz., between religion and religions, but forces abandonment of 
the popular conflation of religion with a body of doctrine. Conceived as process, 
religion must not be confused with a set of religious creeds. To be sure, doctrine, 
both normative and metaphysical (theological), may be essential for religion to 
exist, and particular religions are typically differentiated in terms of doctrine. But 
religion itself, in the sense in which one can be religious, is not doctrine, much less 
doctrine that has emerged from a specific set of religious visions. 
Devine is sensitive to the practical aspect of religion, but his two criteria do not 
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succeed in drawing the process/doctrine distinction. Instead, they function as 
generic conditions which any body of metaphysical and normative claims must 
satisfy in order to qualify as religious doctrine. The first sets forth a core meta-
physical thesis presumably affirmed by all religions, though allowing diverse re-
ligions to vary in their accounts of superhuman agency. The second singles out the 
sense in which religion has a regulatory aspect, embodying recognition of its 
relation to the pursuit of ends. Yet even here Devine employs the phrase 'a 
religion' to designate either theframework of unification which, by some mode of 
symbolic representations, serves to regulate, or the representations themselves 
(p. 273), retaining its image as a body of doctrine, specifically, normative doctrine, 
though religions may differ in their normative content. In no clear way is religion 
as such singled out as a goal-oriented activity or distinguished from the more purely 
theoretical domains of ideology, theology, or theistically-based morality which 
underwrite the framework of a religion. I Similarly, no room is made for religious 
nature of a person who is yet struggling to discover or formulate a unifying frame-
work appropriate for the regulation of life, e.g., the prophets in the attempt to 
articulate their experience. Indeed, a framework or system of representations is 
usually the result of antecedent religious endeavor, but Devine's criteria provide 
no grounds for making this sort of judgment. 2 
The foregoing indicates nothing about what the characteristic goals of religion 
are, nor whether there is any other thread common to all religious activity. It does 
not deny that the religious process utilizes doctrinal statements, common or other-
wise, nor does it destroy the possibility that the two criteria specify necessary con-
ditions for the existence of a religion. The point is simply that his two criteria do 
not yield a characterization whereby religion, in the sense in which one can be 
religious, is distinguished from religion as a body of doctrine. The former, being a 
process from which the latter both emerges yet conditions, is the core of religion 
per se, and an accurate definition must be attentive to its primacy. 
III. Superhuman Agency 
Devine's first criterion is too restrictive on the doctrinal side. By tying religion 
to the notion of a "superhuman" agent upon whose favor human welfare depends, 
he rules out a good deal of religious tradition. The objection is not that religion 
fail to affirm the existence of a superhuman or trans-human reality (being, entity, 
force, order, etc.) upon which human welfare is in some way dependent, nor that 
such reality is in some sense "higher"; indeed, a similar affirmation appears to hold 
in acknowledged manifestations of religion. 3 Rather, the problem is whether this 
trans-human or superhuman entity(s) is an agent which can favor or not, in short, 
whether it is a personal deity capable of preference, choice, intention, and bene-
ficent actions. Exceptions abound in well-acknowledged religious traditions, for 
210 Faith and Philosophy 
example, both Taoism and the classical forms of Buddhism deny a personal aspect 
to the higher reality (despite deification of bodhisattuas in popular forms of 
Mahayana Buddhism). A good deal of the Neo-Platonic tradition in religion, par-
ticularly among certain Philosophical and Sufi movements in Medieval Islam, 
explicitly disavow a view ofthe One (=God) in personal terms, viz., as an "agent" 
capable of intentional action. The preeminent mode of divine activity, creation, 
was viewed as an eternal necessary process of emanation, not as something that 
The One "did." 
We would expect Devine to be more sensitive to this point given his attention to 
what he calls "borderline" cases, Spinozism, Marxism and Free Market ideology. 
On the surface, none of these world-views affirms a superhuman agent, and it is 
perplexing why he ranks them as borderline at all. Spinoza's "God," Devine him-
self emphasizes, always acts out of necessity, and much like the neo-Platonic One, 
is not a person-like agent with the power to grant or withhold favor. By the first 
criterion, therefore, the judgment should be that Spinozism fails to qualify as a 
religion, not that it is a borderline case, and insofar as Spinozism appeals to the 
religious side of one's nature, as Devine admits, this must be for reasons other than 
the criteria he singles out. The same holds even more strongly for Marxism and 
Economism. Both refer to natural and social forces upon which human welfare 
depends, e.g., historical necessity, the marketplace, or, simply, economic laws, 
and I suspect that it is this that inclines Devine, with his first criterion in mind, to 
classify such ideologies as borderline. But it is an abuse of terminology to label 
such forces "agents," as it would be to so refer to botanical categories or the laws 
of Thermodynamics. 
These exceptions force a modification of the common doctrinal core of diverse 
religious systems, and undermine Devine's first criterion. One might object that 
we are taking his talk of "agency" and "favor" too literally, but figurative language 
runs the risk of blurring crucial distinctions; the divide between agency theisms 
and non-agency theisms, between the theologies of Will and the theologies of 
Impersonal Order, is too significant to obliterate in a philosophically sensitive dis-
cussion of religion. 4 A common core may yet bind the two approaches, and re-
course to some vision of a trans-human reality upon which humans are dependent 
may be exactly what is needed, especially if conceived broadly enough to include 
historical necessity, the market, or economic laws. If so, there is more reason to 
acknowledge the borderline character of mentioned philosophies, ideologies or 
world-views, but not on the grounds that Devine provides. 5 
IV. A Sketch of an Improved Account 
In section II it was mentioned that a definition of religion must accommodate the 
religious attitude and recognize the goal-oriented nature of religious life. It is time 
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to ask whether there is any common core to this attitude or any generic goal essen-
tial to the religious process. While there is ample literature on the topic, I will con-
fine myself to an account inspired by the writings of William James and Josiah 
Royce." 
The account can be summarized in three points. First, religion is man's response 
to certain sorts of experience, specifically, to a felt deficiency in the very condi-
tions which have made such experiences possible. As James puts it, there is an 
"uneasiness" about our own condition as we naturally stand. 7 Some locate the 
deficiency in a lack of something of great value, e.g., a proper code of behavior, 
while others point to the presence of something positively evil, e.g., Satan, human 
wickedness, or man's mortality. A tidier generalization locates the genesis of 
religion in suffering, sorrow, and the consequent reflection upon evil. g 
Second, there is a pressing need to find some remedy for the felt deficiency. 
Solutions can be based upon radically different perspectives, from a denial that 
evil exists to a fatalistic acceptance of evil as inevitable, but throughout, religion is 
concerned with enabling humans to overcome, to deal with, or to come to terms 
with, the felt deficiency. There is good reason to refer to a quest for "salvation" at 
this stage, provided this notion is purged of traditional Judaic-Christian-Islamic 
overtones, at least for the purposes of generic description. 91f so, then the quest for 
salvation is absolutely central to the definition of religion, contrary to Devine's 
indication of its "less central" status. 
Third, there appears to be a general conception that salvation is to be achieved 
through some sort of contact with or relationship to the trans-human reality upon 
which our welfare depends, despite the widely differing conceptions about what 
this relationship is or should be. The trans-human reality is seen as possessing some 
sort of efficacy for salvation, underlying its staWs as supremely valuable or, to use 
James' term, "divine." A metaphysics of the divine is needed to give the religious 
quest direction, to provide an identifiable and understandable object or locus for 
belief. It is this effort that can be ranked under the heading of 'theology,' though 
again, a generic concept must be kept free from a commitment to agency theism. 10 
Only through a theology can we understand how salvation is to be achieved. 
In summary, three factors emerge as the principal ingredients of religion: 
(I) Evil (a felt deficiency) 
(2) Quest for Salvation (the urge to remedy this deficiency) 
(3) Divine Reality (the trans-human factor(s) harboring the efficacy 
requisite for salvation) 
A tentative definition of religion can now be offered in these terms: religion is 
a quest on the part of finite beings (like humans) to become saved from (deal 
with, overcome, come to terms with, eliminate, etc.) evil by means of putting 
themselves into relationship with that which is divine. The terms 'to deal with,' 
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'evil,' and 'divine' should be construed as occurring internally, within the scope 
of the term 'quest' ascribing an intentional state, revealing conceptions that the 
beings themselves have of the activity in which they are engaging. II Accordingly, 
a religious being, possessed of religious concern and pursuing a religious goal, 
must have concepts of evil, salvation (dealing with evil) and divinity. 
This definition captures the sense in which religion is primarily process, and only 
secondarily doctrine. Moreover, it is broad enough to bring virtually any mode of 
activity within the realm of religion: prayer, dancing, war, sexual intercourse, 
human sacrifice, music, even the most mundane aspects of everyday life; all that 
is required is a conviction that such actions are conducive, or more strongly, essen-
tial, to the religious end. Similarly, virtually any belief can be incorporated into a 
religious world view, especially those of a normative and cosmological nature 
(see the passage from Dewey cited in Note 1). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
Marxism can be construed religiously, insofar as its adherents adopt a religious 
attitude towards its identifying tenets; the evil to be dealt with is social injustice or 
the consciousness thereof, salvation is the arrival of a purely communist society or 
the confidence that such will come, and the divine saving force is Historical Neces-
sity. The same pattern may be detected in the religious approach to Economism or 
to Spinozistic philosophy. Devine's premonitions here are entirel y correct, though 
not exactly for the reasons he adduces. 
East Carolina University 
NOTES 
I. John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 7, wrote the 
following: " ... the adjective "religious" denotes nothing in the way of a specifiable entity, either 
institutional or as a system of beliefs. It does not denote anything to which one can specifically 
point as one can point to this and that historical religion or existing church. For it does not denote 
anything that can exist by itself or that can be organized into a particular and distinctive form of 
existence. It denotes attitudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal." 
A contrast with the problem of defining science may be helpful here. Ernan McMullin in "The 
History and Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1970), vol. V, p. 
15, distinguishes two senses of the term 'science;' one in which science is viewed as a collection 
of propositions. statements of data, explanations, laws, and theories, and the other in which it is 
considered as the ensemble of all the activities of scientists in the pursuit of their goals of scientific 
understanding. Thus, while science is commonly thought of in terms of its products, viz., its 
theoretical conceptions or even its technological achievements, it is also something that investigators 
do. Furthermore, an understanding of science, a realization of how it differs from other cultural 
domains, necessitates some grasp of the typical aim of such activity, e.g., knowledge of the underlying 
structures of things, oftheir governing laws, etc. By comparison, as religion is even less an intellectual 
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discipline with a consumating aim of acquiring knowledge, it seems a greater error to identify it 
with doctrine, theoretical or normative or both. A provision must be made, in its very characterization, 
for the nature of religion as a goal-oriented process in which individuals can partake. 
2. Devine is not insensitive to the goal-oriented aspect of religion. He speaks of a Supreme Good 
towards which the beliefs and practices characteristic of a religion point (p. 274, my emphasis), 
and states that it is the possibility of union or communion with the Supreme Good that the two 
criteria of religion are unified, particularly in a religion like Christianity (p. 274). Yet this is to add 
an element not overtly contained in either criterion, despite his claim that the notion of a Supreme 
Good is "part" of one criterion establishing presence of a religion (presumably, the second). The 
latter is confusing given his subsequent refusal to make the aim towards or "ultimate concern" with 
a Supreme Good a necessary condition for existence of a religion--citing the religion of Homeric 
Greece-while nonetheless retaining both criteria. (The example might be disputed insofar as the 
Greeks invoked divine intervention through prayers and libations, and, recalling the importance of 
the Delphic Oracle, vigorously sought to discern the divine "favor." Such activities normally bespeak 
of reasonably significant or "ultimate" concern with achieving at least the goods of this life, whether 
appropriately "supreme" or not.) Perhaps he means simply that directing adherents of a religion to 
a Supreme Good is one of the ways in which the unification spoken of in the second criterion can 
be achieved; indeed, modifying the latter to include aim toward a Supreme Good will blunt the 
impact of the criticism just offered insofar as a religious goal is now explicitly specified. It would 
not, however, overcome the process/doctrine difficulty. 
3. Arnold Toynbee in An Historian's Approach to Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1956), has claimed that at least the "higher" religions posit a spiritually greater presence in the 
Universe with which man should seek communion and harmony. See also his chapter entitled 
"Religion: A Perennial Need"" in Arnold Toynbee, Surviving the Future (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971). 
4. I am using the term 'theism' in a generic sense to refer to the doctrine which affirms the existence 
of divine beings. It is a distinct matter whether these beings are "agents" in the proper sense. 
5. In several places, Arnold Toynbee has argued that Marxism has all the qualifications of a religion, 
for example, in his Mankind and Mother Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 573. 
See also the works mentioned in note 3 above. 
6. See William James' Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Random House, 1929), and 
Josiah Royce's Sources of Religious Insight (New York: Scribner'S, 1914). The coupling of James 
and Royce on this issue may strike the reader as strange, especially in view of their numerous 
philosophical differences. Indeed, John E. Smith has written that the two are "opposite" in their 
interpretation of religion (see Smith's The Spirit of American Philosophy SUNY, 1983, p. 79). 
Despite these differences, I discern, nonetheless, a common core in their respective approaches to 
the nature of religion. 
7. James, op. cit. p. 498, and note the similar view in Royce, op. cit. pp. 9-12. 
8. This generalization emerges in chapter VI of Royce op. cit. While James uses the term 'evil' 
more sparingly (see, for example, op. cit., pp. 131, 160), his description of the "common nucleus" 
of all religions (pp. 498-9) reveals that the notion of evil has the centrality that it has in Royce's 
own account. 
9. Both James and Royce avail themselves of the term 'salvation,' for example, James op. cit., p. 
498 and Royce. op. cit., p. 8, with both attentive to the necessity of a suitably broad interpretation. 
10. See James op. cit., pp. 31-32 where he writes that "religion means the feelings, acts, and 
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experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in 
relation to whatever they may consider divine." In his concern for achieving a neutral description 
he speaks of "higher powers" or a "higher part of the universe" (pp. 475- 509). Royce speaks, of 
a "master of life" and a "triumph of good in the universe," op. cit .. p. 223. 
II. When a term occurs internally in contexts ascribing an intentional state it is intended to reveal 
the agent's mode of representation of the ascribed content, and in this I am following the usage of 
Hector-Neri Castaneda. See Castaneda's "Reference, Reality and Perceptual Fields," Proceedings 
and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 53, no. 6, (1980): 763-822, especially 
pp.774-783. 
